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1. INTRODUCTION
Does incompleteness of nancial markets impede risk sharing? This pa-
per presents a simple model suggesting that it may not, provided consumers
are patient, risk is purely idiosyncratic, and bond markets are open.
To make this point, we consider a one-good, innite horizon exchange
economy. Intertemporal trade is accomplished through short-lived real as-
sets, one of which is a riskless real bond. The population consists of a nite
number of innitely lived consumers, who maximize discounted expected
utility relative to stationary period utility functions. Consumers share com-
mon probability assessments and a common subjective discount factor r.
Risk is purely idiosyncratic; that is, each consumer's endowment follows
an iid process, but the social endowment is constant. Our conclusion is that,
when the discount factor is close to 1 (that is, when consumers are suf-
ciently patient), equilibrium utilities are close to the utilities of perfect risk
sharing.
Of course the idea that patientconsumerscan self-insure isnot a new one.
Yaari (1976) for example, considers a perfectly patient consumer who lives
a long but nite lifetime, faces an uncertain endowment stream, and can
borrow and save at a zero interest rate. Yaari shows that the optimal plan
for such a consumer has the property that, as the consumer's lifetime tends
to innity, the per period average utility converges to the utility of con-
stant average consumption. Our work differs fundamentally from Yaari's
however, because we treat an equilibrium problem, not just an individual
optimization problem. In particular, we derive the equilibrium interest rate.
Moreover, although this rate cannot be much above 0, it might be quite neg-
ative. Because saving is difcult when the interest rate is quite negative, an
argument like Yaari's cannot be made in our environment. Indeed, our ar-
gument rests on the ability of consumers to self-insure by borrowing alone,
without ever saving.
The questions we ask here are reminiscent of what Friedman (1957)
called the permanent income hypothesis: that consumers behave in such
a way to maintain a constant marginal utility of income. See Yaari (1976)
and Bewley (1980) for theoretical formulations and analysis of Friedman's
idea. Our work parallels simulations carried out by Telmer (1993) and Lu-
cas (1994), who found that market incompleteness is not sufcient to ex-
plain observed large variances in riskless interest rates (the riskless rate
puzzle) or the observed large premium over equities over riskless securi-
ties (the equity premium puzzle).
Some of our assumptions are quite strong. Levine and Zame (1999) ex-
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that paper concludes that market incompleteness is compatible with per-
fect risk sharing even if endowments are recurrent Markov (rather than iid)
and there is aggregate risk, provided options on the social endowment are
traded. On the other hand, riskless bonds alone do not provide perfect risk
sharing when there is aggregate risk. Moreover, if there is more than one
consumption good, then price risk  introduced endogenously through the
action of the market  may interfere further with perfect risk sharing.
2. THE ECONOMY
2.1. Time and Uncertainty. Time and uncertainty are represented by a
countably innite tree S. Each node on the tree represents a date-event.
The initial date-event (the root of the tree) is denoted by 0 2 S. For date-
events s;s0 2 S, we write s  s0 to mean that s0 follows s (and s precedes
s0). For each date-event s 2 S other than 0, we write s  for the (unique)
date-event that immediately precedes s and s+ for the set of date-events that
immediately follow s. For simplicity, we assume s+ is nite.
Each s2S is a nite history of exogenous events; we denote the length of
that history by t(s). Thus t(s ) = t(s) 1 and t(0) = 0. A complete path
through the tree S is a complete history of exogenous events; write H for the
set of all such innite histories. Given a history h 2 H and a date t, write ht
for the history up to and including time t. Thus ht 2 S and t(ht) = t. In our
notation, S is the set of nite histories and H is the set of innite histories.
2.2. Commodities. There is a single consumption good available at each
date-event. The commodity space is the space `¥(S) of bounded functions
x : S ! R. For x 2 `¥(S), we write xs 2 R for the bundle specied at node
s. A consumption plan is an element of `¥(S)+; that is, a bounded function
x : S ! R+. Since there is a single consumption good, we normalize so that
its spot price is 1 at each date event s 2 S, and henceforward suppress spot
prices.
2.3. Securities. Intertemporal trades takes place through the exchange of
securities. For simplicity, we assume that J securities are available at each
date-event, that security returns are denominated in units of the consump-
tion good, and that each security is short-lived, yielding returns only at the
immediate successor nodes. The portfolio q 2 RJ of securities acquired at
date-events2S yieldsas dividendsdivsq unitsof the numeraire commodity
at the date-event s 2 s+. (Note that divs : RJ ! R is a linear operator.) We
assumethat a risklessbond(numbered A1) istraded at each node; A1
s(s)=1
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2.4. Utilities. There are N innitely lived traders i= 1;:::;I, having utility
functions Ui : `¥(S)+ ! R. We assume traders maximize the discounted










We assume that ui is a smooth (C3) strictly concave function, with a strictly
positive rst derivative. We frequently write Ui
r in order to emphasize the
dependence on the discount factor r, which we think of as a parameter.
The leading factor (1 r) normalizes so that the discounted utility of the
constant consumption stream c is ui(c), independent of the discount factor
r.
2.5. Endowments. We asssume individual endowments are iid, and that
range of the endowment process is nite.
2.6. Budget Sets and Debt Constraints. Given security prices q, trader i
chooses a consumption plan xi : S ! R+ and a portfolio trading plan qi :







That is, expenditure to purchase consumption and to purchase securities
does not exceed income from sale of endowment and from dividends on se-
curities acquired at the previous date-event. In our innite horizon setting,
these spot constraints are not sufcient to rule out Ponzi schemes (dou-
bling strategies) and hence unlimited amounts of borrowing. As we show
in Levine and Zame (1996), the additional constraints necessary to rule out
Ponzi schemes may be formalized in any of a number of ways, each of
which leads to an equivalent notion of equilibrium.1 Here we nd it conve-
nient to formalize the constraints by requiring that it should be possible to
repay almost all the debt in nite time.
To this end, x prices q, a consumption plan xi and a portfolio plan qi for
trader i that satises the spot budget constraint at each date-event s. Dene
trader i's debt at date events as his obligationto repay on securities he holds
entering date event s:
ds =  divsqi
s 
If this quantity is positive, trader i is in debt. To meet this debt, trader i
must raise income from the sale of endowment and/or securities (selling
securities is borrowing). We constrain debt at date-event s by prescribing
1See also Magill and Quinzii (1994).RISK SHARING AND MARKET INCOMPLETENESS 4
a positive upper bound on ds.2 (Prescribing a negative upper bound would
require traders to save.) We say that the debt ds  0 can be repaid in T
periods from s if there are consumption and portfolio plans y;j such that:
 y;j satisfy the spot budget constraint at every date event
 if s < s then ys = xi
s and js = qi
s
 if s  s and t(s) t(s) T then ds  0
That is, the plans y;j meet the spot budget constraints at every date-event,
agree with xi;qi prior to the date-event s, and leave no debt at any date-event
following s by T or more periods. The debt ds  0 can be repaid in nite
time from s if it can be repaid in T periods for some T. Dene the nitely
effective debt constraints as:
Di
s = inffd : d can be paid in nite time from sg
Finally, dene the budget set for trader i at prices q as:
Bi(q) =





s  ;ds  Di
s
	
Note that we constrain behavior at date event s by limits on debt at succeed-
ing date events s 2 s+.
2.7. Equilibrium. An equilibrium consists of security prices q, consump-
tion plans (xi) and portfolio plans (qi) such that













 for each i:
(xi;qi) 2 Bi(q) and (yi;ji) 2 Bi(q) )Ui(xi) Ui(yi)
That is, commodity markets clear, security markets clear, traders optimize
in their budget sets. Levine and Zame (1996) show that (with assumptions
weaker than those made here) an equilibrium exists.
2The reader familiar with Levine and Zame (1996) will note that we use here the oppo-
site sign convention for debt and debt constraints.RISK SHARING AND MARKET INCOMPLETENESS 5
3. PERFECT RISK SHARING
We make 2 additional assumptions:
Assumption 1 The social endowment e = åheh
s is constant across states
and time (no aggregate risk).3
Assumption 2 For each h, Duh is convex.
The latter assumption will be satised if absolute risk aversion is non-










Simplifying and transposing yields
(D3uh)(Duh)  (D2uh)2
We have assumed that Duh > 0, so we conclude that D3uh > 0 so that Duh
is convex as asserted.
We are interested in the nature of equilibrium for discount factors r close
to 1. It is convenient therefore to x securities, endowments and period
utility functions ui. For each discount factor r < 1, write Er for the econ-
omy with the securities, endowments and period utility functions, in which
traders use the common discount factor r, and write Er for the set of equi-
libria of Er.
Because individual endowments are iid with nite range, they each pos-
sess a long run average; write ¯ ei for the long run average of ei. Our as-
sumptions imply that, for every r, Pareto optimal allocations of Er consist
of constant shares of the constant social endowment. In particular, the per-
fect risk-sharing allocation ¯ e = (¯ e1;:::; ¯ eN) at which each trader consumes
a constant amount, equal to his long run average endowment, is Pareto op-
timal (for every r).
Our main result below asserts that when r is sufciently close to 1 (that
is, when consumers are sufciently patient), equilibrium utilities are close
to the utilities of the perfect risk sharing allocation.










3Because the social endowment is constant and the number of consumers is nite, indi-
vidual endowments must necessarily be correlated with each other. However, this correla-
tion is an artifact of the niteness of our model; a model with a continuum of consumers
would permit us to assume a constant social endowment and independent individual en-
dowments. We prefer the model with a nite numberof consumers because we can rely on
Levine and Zame (1996) to guarantee that equilibrium exists.RISK SHARING AND MARKET INCOMPLETENESS 6
Before beginning the proof, we record two useful lemmas. The rst
is simply a convenient version of Kolmogorov's generalization of Cheby-
shev's inequality; see Feller (1971, p. 242).
Lemma 1 Let (zt) be an iid sequence of bounded random variables with

















for every A > 0.
The second lemma provides a lower bound for the price of the riskless
bond (and hence an upper bound for the riskless interest rate).
Lemma 2 If q;xi;qi is an equilibrium, s is a date event and A1
s is a riskless
bond then q1
s  r.
Proof Let K N be the number of traders whose equilibriumconsumptions
at s are strictly positive. Re-numbering if necessary, assume that xk
s > 0 for
k = 1;:::;K and that xi
s = 0 for i > K.
Let M be the set of K-tuples µ = (µ1;:::;µK) 2 RK
+ for which there are
consumptions c1;:::;cK such that å
K
k=1ck  es and µk  Duk(ck) for all
k = 1;:::;K. We assert that M is a convex set. Let µa;µb 2 M. Then by the

















which proves that lµa+(1 l)µb is in M which shows that M is convex.
By assumption, at the date-event s each of the traders k  K has strictly
positive consumption. Because A1
s is riskless, the rst order condition for
an equilibrium implies that, for each k  K,
q0
sDuk(xk























belongs to M. The denition of M guarantees that there are consumptionsRISK SHARING AND MARKET INCOMPLETENESS 7
(ck) such that åck  e and (q1
s=r)Duk(xk
s)  Duk(ck) for each k. Because
each uk is concave, Duk is decreasing. If q1
s=r < 1 then it would follow that
xk
s  ck for each k, contradicting the fact that åck  e = åxk
s. We conclude
that q1
s=r  1, and hence that q1
s  r, as asserted.
With these lemmas in hand, we turn to the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem Fix a discount factor r, a trader i and a small real num-
ber e > 0. We show that equilibrium utility Ui
r(xi) cannot be much less
than ui(¯ ei), provided r is sufciently close to 1. To accomplish this, we
construct alternative feasible consumption and portfolio plans yi;ji so that
Ui
r(yi)  ui(¯ ei) for r close to 1. Individual optimization will guarantee that
equilibrium utilities are at least as large as Ui
r(yi); the nature of the Pareto
set will guarantee that equilibrium utilities cannot be much larger than this.
The alternative consumption and portfolio plans involve consumption
and buying and selling the riskless bond (only). The consumption plan
prescribes consumption level almost equal to ¯ ei  e until the debt exceeds
a predetermined limit; the portfolio plan prescribes buying and selling the
riskless bond in order to maintain this consumption level. Debt will be re-
paid when endowment is high and additional debt will be incurred when
endowment is low. The quantity e represents the interest required to service
the debt.
There is no loss in assuming that ui(0) = 0. Set m = minsei
s, and x a
real number e with 0 < e < m. Set d = e=(1 r) and d = d  ¯ ei. We use
d as a debt limit and e as a set-aside to pay interest on the debt.
For each date event s, write ys for consumption and bs for the sales of
the riskless bond. No other securities will be bought or sold, so debt at date
event s is ds = bs . We prescribe consumption and portfolio choices ys;bs
at date event s in the following way:
(1) If ds  d for all s  s and ei






That is: if the debt limit has not been reached and ei
s < ¯ ei, consume
¯ ei e, repay e of the outstanding debt, and roll over the remaining
debt.
(2) If ds  d for all s  s and ei









That is: if the debt limit has not been reached and ei
s  ¯ ei, consume
¯ ei  e, repay e+(ei
s   ¯ ei) of the outstanding debt (but never repayRISK SHARING AND MARKET INCOMPLETENESS 8
more than the outstanding debt; i.e., never save), and roll over the
remaining debt.





That is: if the debt limit has been reached, consume ei
s e, use e to
service the existing debt, and roll the remaining debt.
By construction, this consumption/portfolio plan satises the spot budget
constraints at every date event. To see that it satises the debt constraints,
note rst that, because e < m, a debt of d can be carried forever. (Use
e of the endowment to repay part of the debt and and sell (1=q1
s)(d  e)
units of the riskless bond, leaving a debt of (1=q1
s)(d   e) next period.
Because q1
s  r, the next period's debt will not exceed d.) Hence any
debt less than d can be repaid in nite time. In particular, the specied
consumption/portfolio plan, which never attains a debt as large as d at any
date event, satises the debt constraint.
To obtain a lower bound for Ui
r(yi) we estimate how long the consump-
tion/portfolio plan is likely to continue before hitting the debt constraint.
To this end, write M = maxei
s, and set z = ¯ ei  ei; z is an iid process with
mean 0 and variance at most M. If the debt limit has not been exceeded at
the date event s, then the change in debt from s to s+ is (1=r)zs at the date
event s (debt increases if zs > 0 and decreases if zs < 0), except that debt is
never allowed to become negative. Thus the debt limit d will not be reached
















LetH0 bethesetof historiesh2H suchthatjZT(h)jd=2foreveryT <T0.
If trader i follows the plan yi;ji in the history h 2 H0, he will consume at
least ¯ ei  e at every date T < T0 and at least 0 thereafter, so his utility in





rtui(¯ ei e) = (1 rT0)ui(¯ ei e)RISK SHARING AND MARKET INCOMPLETENESS 9
(Recall that ui(0) = 0.) Our specications of A;T0 imply that AT
1=2
0 = d=2
and M=A2 = (1 r)








Hence Prob(H0)  1 (1 r)1=2, so consumer i's expected utility if he








From the denition of T0, we see that as r ! 1, T0=e2=4M(1 r)3=2 ! 1.












r(xi)  ui(¯ ei e)






r(xi)  ui(¯ ei)
for each i.
As we have already noted, the constant allocation (¯ ei) is Pareto optimal.
Strict concavity of utility functions implies that the Pareto set is strictly












for each i, which is the desired result.
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